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VICTIMS, “CLOSURE,” AND THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTION 
 
SUSAN A. BANDES* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
For the families of murder victims, the grief, anger, and pain a murder 
leaves in its wake must to some degree unfold in public, institutional settings. 
Grieving is rarely an entirely private, internal experience. In every culture, grief 
is experienced and expressed against a background of social expectations and, 
ideally, within a network of social support. The expectations facing murder 
survivors1 include the grim task of cooperating with the criminal justice system, 
a task that may include a public trial and intense media scrutiny. Over the last 
couple of decades, this grim task has undergone a “symbolic transformation,”2 
particularly in the death penalty context. Every aspect of the capital system has 
been recast as serving therapeutic goals—specifically, helping survivors heal 
and attain closure. This incursion of the language of emotion and healing into 
the legal realm has been insufficiently examined, especially given its enormous 
practical and symbolic consequences for the operation of the death penalty. 
Closure is a term with no accepted psychological meaning. It is, in fact, an 
unacknowledged umbrella term for a host of loosely related and often 
empirically dubious concepts. Nevertheless, it is a concept that has had a 
meteoric rise, both in the public consciousness and in the legal arena.3 Virtually 
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 1. The term “survivors” denotes family members and others bereaved by murder. 
 2. FRANK ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 42 (2003). 
 3. Prior to 1989, the terms “closure” and “death penalty” were never mentioned together. They 
were linked once in 1989. Starting in 1993, the mentions grew geometrically to more than 500 in 2001. 
For the first time in 2001, an ABC News–Washington Post poll asked whether the death penalty is fair 
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unmentioned only two decades ago, closure has been enthusiastically embraced 
not only as a legitimate psychological state but as one that the legal system 
ought to help victims and survivors attain. In the death penalty context, its rapid 
embrace has changed the way we talk about the rationale for capital 
punishment; it has changed the shape of the legal process; it has even changed 
what both survivors and jurors within the capital system expect to feel. 
The term closure has come to connote several different and poorly 
differentiated concepts, each with separate and quite serious implications for 
the conduct of the capital trial. Closure is sometimes used to refer to the sense 
of catharsis that comes of speaking publicly about one’s loss. Advocates of 
victim impact statements argue that the statements assist with healing and 
closure because they permit victims and survivors to give voice to their pain and 
sense of loss in a public setting.4 Closure has also come to stand for the 
constellation of feelings—peace, relief, a sense of justice, the ability to move 
on—that comes with finality. The term sometimes refers to the ability to find 
answers to the terrible questions a murder may leave open—for example, the 
circumstances of the murder or the identity of the killer.5 This sort of closure 
might require solving an open crime, but it might also involve some sort of 
interaction with the killer in an attempt to learn more.6 It might require a 
verdict and imposition of a sentence. In the capital context, it might require a 
sentence of death.7 The logical outgrowth of this argument is that only an 
 
because it gives closure to the families of murder victims. Sixty percent agreed with this statement 
strongly or moderately. ZIMRING, supra note 2, at 60. 
 4. See, e.g., Edna Erez, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim 
Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice, CRIM. L. REV. 545, 550–53 (1999) (arguing, in the context 
of noncapital cases, that the use of victim impact statements is empowering for victims). 
 5. See, e.g., Chip Brown, The Confessor: Conversations with a Serial Killer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Apr. 29, 2007, at 39 (discussing a detective who uses the term to describe a motive for his quest to solve 
open murder cases); see also For the Family of Sneha Anne Philip, Closure, N.Y. MAG., Jan. 31, 2008, 
available at http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2008/01/for_the_family_of_sneha_ann_ph.html (discussing the 
efforts of the family of a woman missing since September 10, 2001 to prove that she had died at the 
World Trade Center, rather than as the victim of a crime in which her own recklessness might have 
played a role, and their vindication in a Manhattan appellate court). 
 6. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. CRIM. L.J. 329, 336–
37 (2007) (“[M]any [victims] want to confront offenders face to face, tell their stories, and understand 
why their crimes happened.”). 
 7. In their review of news articles about executions that recount the reactions of the victims’ 
family members, Sam Gross and Daniel Matheson found a broad range of reactions. Among the 
minority who said they had experienced some sort of closure, the term was given several different 
meanings, including relief that the long court process had ended, relief that the defendant could not 
hurt anyone else, and relief that the defendant would stop receiving so much press attention. None 
claimed that his or her suffering for the loss would be in any way alleviated by the execution. Samuel R. 
Gross & Daniel J. Matheson, What They Say at the End: Capital Victims’ Families and the Press, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 486, 490–94 (2003); see also Vik Kanwar’s interesting discussion of closure as a 
“sanitized version” of the more visceral “satisfaction.” Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure”: 
the Limits of a Victim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 248 (2001). 
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execution can provide closure, and that delays and impediments to execution 
deprive survivors of the closure they need.8 
Each of the above meanings of the term closure has been offered as the 
rationale for various initiatives that have helped transform the capital system. 
The need for closure has become the predominant argument for victim impact 
testimony. It has become an effective argument for limiting procedural 
protections that delay conviction, sentencing, final judgment, or execution. It 
has taken on the authoritative ring of a clinically accepted reason for execution 
itself. In short, it has transformed expectations about the purposes of a capital 
trial, offering a promise to survivors and society at large that the legal system 
may be ill-equipped to keep. And, at the most basic theoretical level, closure 
has recast the traditional debate about the purposes of capital punishment, 
suggesting that support for the death penalty can be premised on the urge to 
offer solace and healing to survivors of murder. 
On one level, there is an irony to the success of closure as a legal concept. 
The phenomenon seems to contradict the conventional wisdom that the legal 
system abjures emotion as an unwarranted interference with rational 
deliberation. At first glance it might even seem to be good news for those who 
argue in favor of recognizing emotion’s role in the deliberative process. To the 
contrary, the unwarranted embrace of closure should be understood as a 
consequence of the law’s unwillingness to grapple with the role of emotion. This 
unwillingness is often expressed as a mistaken belief that it is both possible and 
desirable to banish emotions—as a class—from the legal realm, except in 
carefully delineated contexts.9 The closure phenomenon illustrates the converse 
mistake—a belief that certain emotional claims should be sacrosanct; off limits 
to the rigors of legal analysis. The better approach is to recognize that emotion 
influences legal actors and legal institutions in numerous ways, some desirable 
and some undesirable. Then we can begin the difficult task of evaluating which 
emotions ought to be encouraged or discouraged in particular legal contexts—
and how this might be accomplished. These descriptive and normative questions 
cannot be addressed as long as emotions are ignored and denied on the one 
hand, and enshrined and insulated on the other. 
The desirability of emotions, or of any particular emotion, cannot be 
evaluated as an abstract proposition. An emotional process or outcome that 
 
 8. For example, closure is cited by lower courts as a value militating against granting defense 
motions that might delay or reopen a capital case. See, e.g., Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1342 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (describing the government’s compelling interests, which in this case outweighed the capital 
defendant’s due process argument for post-conviction access to biological evidence, as including 
“guarding against a flood of requests, protecting the finality of convictions, and ensuring closure for 
victims and survivors”); see also Skaggs v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-SC-0436-MR, 2005 WL 2314073, 
at *5 (Ky. Sept. 22, 2005) (“Surely the family and friends of the two victims are entitled to some 
consideration as to the closure of these grisly and senseless murders . . . .”); State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 
130, 135 (Idaho 2005) (citing survivor and victim closure as interests weighing against reopening or 
delaying a verdict). 
 9. SUSAN BANDES, THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1–19 (1999). 
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advances familial, spiritual, or therapeutic goals may be poorly suited for a 
court of law. For example, when we speak of healing or closure, we ought to 
attend closely to the emotional outcomes we are trying to facilitate, and to 
whether a capital proceeding is an appropriate place to facilitate them. The 
failure to grapple with the role of emotion in law generally, and with the role of 
particular emotions in specific social settings, has had enormous consequences 
for capital jurisprudence and the operation of the capital system.10 
II 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTION 
Twenty-five years ago, in The Managed Heart, her seminal work on the 
sociology of emotion, Arlie Hochschild called the tendency to treat emotions as 
private and internal one of the major barriers to serious inquiry into the nature 
of emotions.11 This tendency is also a barrier to constructing and maintaining 
fair and effective legal institutions. When emotions are regarded as acontextual 
entities rather than dynamic processes, it appears seductively logical to 
extrapolate from studies of private, internal emotion to contexts involving 
complex groups, or involving public settings. And the social sciences for too 
long took precisely this approach: studying individual subjects and their 
individual emotions,12 and then assuming the findings had broad application to 
emotions in diverse contexts.13 
More recently, a number of disciplines have begun focusing on emotion in 
social contexts. The sociology of emotion is now a burgeoning field.14 
Psychologists are increasingly interested in emotion and social cognition, 
emotional dynamics in group settings,15 and the interaction between emotion 
and culture.16 Anthropologists, too, are beginning to incorporate the study of 
emotion into their cultural analyses.17 Political scientists are beginning to think 
 
 10. See infra III–VII. 
 11. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING 
201–203 (1983). 
 12. Ninety-five percent of all studies of emotion involve individual subjects. E-mail from Dacher 
Keltner, Psychologist and Director of the Berkeley Social Interaction Laboratory, to Susan Bandes 
(May 2, 2007) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 13. Psychologist Jerome Kagan observes that social scientists tend to “generate hypotheses from 
abstract concepts rather than concepts that are closely tied to observed phenomena.” JEROME KAGAN, 
THREE SEDUCTIVE IDEAS 78 (1998). 
 14. JONATHAN H. TURNER & JAN E. STETS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS 1 (2005). 
 15. See, e.g., Eliot R. Smith, Charles R. Seger & Diane M. Mackie, Can Emotions Be Truly Group 
Level? Evidence Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 431 (2007). 
 16. See, e.g., PAULA M. NIEDENTHAL ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION: INTERPERSONAL, 
EXPERIENTIAL, AND COGNITIVE APPROACHES 305–342 (2006). 
 17. See, e.g., Catherine Lutz and Geoffrey M. White, The Anthropology of Emotions, 15 ANN. 
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 405 (1986) (noting the move away from relegating emotion to the sidelines of 
culture theory). 
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about the role of emotion in democratic deliberation.18 And most recently, the 
emerging field of affective neuroscience has been examining the neural 
dynamics of emotional interchange. One of its founders, Richard Davidson, 
observes, “You can’t separate the cause of an emotion from the world of 
relationships—our social interactions are what drive our emotions.”19 
In short, we know that emotions are not formed, experienced, or expressed 
in a vacuum. There are likely some basic emotions that exist across cultures,20 
but even as to those, social context shapes not only how they are communicated 
to others, but how they are formed, experienced, and interpreted by the 
individual.21 And once intergroup behavior is added to the mix, questions arise 
both about how the expression and interpretation of emotion change in a group 
context, and about how an emotional climate may arise in a group—through 
mechanisms like emotional contagion and synchronization.22 
It is becoming increasingly clear that understanding these dynamics is an 
interdisciplinary project.23 The need for interdisciplinary interchange highlights 
the importance of specifying context. A neuroscientist seeking to measure fear 
responses in the amygdalae of lab rats, an anthropologist comparing cultural 
responses to the approach of strangers, and a psychologist studying fear of 
maternal separation in infants may have much to learn from one another; but 
they first have to find a common language. Their uses of the term “fear” 
describe different agents, targets, contexts, methodologies, and research goals, 
and the term will be useful only if these are specified.24 The use of the term 
 
 18. E.g., SHARON KRAUSE, CIVIL PASSIONS: MORAL SENTIMENT AND DEMOCRATIC 
DELIBERATION (2008); see also GEORGE LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND (2008); GEORGE E. 
MARCUS, THE SENTIMENTAL CITIZEN: EMOTION IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2002); DREW WESTEN, 
THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007). 
 19. DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 
83 (2006) (quoting Richard Davidson, Director of the Laboratory for Affective Neuroscience at the 
University of Wisconsin); see also Richard J. Davidson & Steven K. Sutton, Affective Neuroscience: The 
Emergence of a Discipline, 5 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 217 (1995). 
 20. The extent to which emotions are biologically rooted is also an important and burgeoning area 
of study. See, e.g., ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN 
THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 51 (1999) (referring to a group of primary or universal emotions—
happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust—and to a larger group of secondary or social 
emotions, and arguing that although culture and learning can alter the expression and meaning of 
emotions, all share a biological core); see also Erin O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and 
Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1140–51 (2002) (discussing the biologically rooted taste for 
apology and forgiveness); Andrew Ortony & Terence J. Turner, What’s Basic About Basic Emotions?, 
97 PSYCHOL. REV. 315 (1990) (raising the possibility that the concept of basic emotions is an article of 
faith); Peggy Thoits, The Sociology of Emotions, 15 ANN. REV. SOC. 317, 320 (1989) (noting the 
ongoing debate about socially constructed versus basic or biologically rooted emotions). 
 21. See, e.g., TURNER & STETS, supra note 14, at 2 (explaining the social construction of emotions). 
 22. See, e.g., Sigal G. Barsade, The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and Its Influence on Group 
Behavior, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 644, 644–75 (2002). 
 23. See Arvid Kappas, The Science of Emotion as a Multidisciplinary Research Paradigm, 60 
BEHAV. PROCESSES 85 (2002). 
 24. KAGAN, supra note 13, at 14–38; see also JEROME KAGAN, WHAT IS EMOTION?: HISTORY, 
MEASURES, AND MEANINGS 4–10 (2007). 
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“altruism” provides another example of the problem: whereas psychologists 
puzzle over the motivations for altruism,25 philosophers are divided over 
whether to define it in terms of a mere willingness to aid others, irrespective of 
motivation,26 and evolutionary biologists often use it to describe behavior such 
as helping one’s kin in order to promote replication—in other words, behavior 
that common parlance is unlikely to classify as strictly altruistic.27 The imprecise 
use of terms describing emotional states and processes may hinder rather than 
facilitate interchange. Left undefined or insufficiently contextualized, these 
terms may serve only to conflate and confuse concepts that diverge in important 
respects. 
Moreover, there is no accepted definition of the term emotion.28 Indeed, the 
more light is shed on the dynamics of cognitive processing, the less likely it 
appears that emotion defines a discrete function or phenomenon. The term will 
need to be provisionally defined for analytic purposes, but “it should not be 
reified.”29 
Current neurobiological research views emotions as a set of processes, 
distributed throughout the brain, that assist us in appraising and reacting to 
stimuli, and that are very sensitive to context.30 Recent work in psychology and 
sociology also portrays emotions as processes formed, interpreted, and 
communicated in social context.31 They influence the way we screen, categorize, 
and interpret information. They influence our evaluations of the intentions and 
credibility of others. They help us decide what is important or valuable. Perhaps 
most important, they drive us to care about the outcome of our decisionmaking, 
and motivate us to take action, or refrain from taking action, on the situations 
 
 25. See, e.g., C. Daniel Batson, Prosocial Motivation: Is It Ever Truly Altruistic?, 20 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 65 (1987). 
 26. There is no unanimity about the meaning of altruism in the philosophical literature. See, e.g., 
Symposium, 10 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Winter 1993, at 1 (devoting an entire issue to the philosophy of 
altruism). 
 27. The classic behavioral definition of altruism is “behavior that benefits another organism, not 
closely related, while being apparently detrimental to the organism performing the behavior, benefit 
and detriment being defined in terms of contribution to inclusive fitness.” Robert L. Trivers, The 
Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 1, 35 (1971). The adaptationist view, however, 
focuses on evolved design rather than on behavior; processes such as “kin selection” and “reciprocal 
altruism” lead to the evolution of mechanisms designed to deliver benefits to other organisms because 
such behaviors lead to the replication of the genes that underlie them. Robert Kurzban, Biological 
Foundations of Reciprocity, in TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND GAINS FROM ASSOCIATION: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 105–27 (E. Ostrom and J. Walker 
eds., 2003); John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Friendship and the Banker’s Paradox: Other Pathways to the 
Evolution of Adaptations for Altruism, PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 88, 119–43 (1996). I am grateful to Rob 
Kurzban for his guidance on these issues. 
 28. See generally 22 EMOTION RESEARCHER (2006–2007) (the definition issue, which contains a 
dizzyingly wide array of suggested definitions). The Emotion Researcher is the Official Newsletter for 
the International Society for Research on Emotion. 
 29. Id. at 9 (definition of Anna Wierzbicka). 
 30. Id. at 7 (definition of Arvid Kappas), 12 (definition of Manfred Holodynski). 
 31. TURNER & STETS, supra note 14, at 1. 
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we evaluate.32 All these processes are shaped, refined, and communicated in a 
social and cultural context. 
The insight that emotional experience and expression vary across contexts 
and cultures has to some degree entered conventional wisdom. We commonly 
speak, for example, about shame cultures and guilt cultures,33 or about honor 
cultures—the vigilante tradition34 in certain southern states, for example. My 
focus here is on the fact that emotion norms vary not only across geographic 
lines, but among other more subtly drawn “emotion cultures” as well. The 
distinctions among these emotion cultures are in part about the acceptable 
expression of emotion. Display rules,35 or expression norms, regulate the 
acceptable range of emotional behavior and provide scripts for socially 
appropriate enactment of emotion. Sociologists have been investigating the 
means by which emotion cultures transmit not only display rules, but also 
feeling rules (emotion norms), which “specify the emotions that individuals 
should feel in a situation.”36 For example, sociologist Candace Clark’s influential 
study of sympathy norms describes implicit rules governing both the feeling and 
expression of sympathy—rules that vary across cultures, across time, and by 
class and gender.37 Sociologists argue that these implicit rules and norms teach 
us what we ought to be feeling, and in doing so, guide the way we shape and 
experience our inchoate emotions.38 The investigation of feeling rules is a 
complex topic, comprising a wide range of sociological approaches too 
 
 32. The precise means by which emotion and cognition interact are very much a matter of debate. 
See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 
(1994) (exploring the somatic marker hypothesis); Joseph Forgas, Mood and Judgment: The Affect 
Infusion Model, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 39 (1995) (presenting a model of affective states as influences on 
social judgment); Oliver Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to Normative 
Judgment in Law and Justice, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON SERIES B 359, 1717 (2004) 
(considering the impact of findings of cognitive neuroscience about moral reasoning on legal 
reasoning); Elizabeth A. Phelps, The Interaction of Emotion and Cognition: Insights from Studies of the 
Human Amygdala, in EMOTIONS AND CONSCIOUSNESS (Lisa Feldman Barrett et al. eds., 2005) 
(exploring the role of the human amygdala in regulating emotion and cognition). 
 33. See, e.g., Linda Seward, Shame and Guilt Cultures, http://mtsu32.mtsu.edu:11283/shame_guilt. 
htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2008) (charting the differences between shame cultures and guilt cultures for 
the benefit of students planning to study abroad). 
 34. ZIMRING, supra note 2, at 89. 
 35. See, e.g., Thoits, supra note 20, at 322. The work of Erving Goffman on interaction rituals is 
seminal to the study of cultural scripts for performing and interpreting emotions. See ERVING 
GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974); ERVING 
GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR (1967) [hereinafter 
GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL]; ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY 
LIFE (1959). 
 36. Thoits, supra note 20, at 323. 
 37. See CANDACE CLARK, MISERY AND COMPANY: SYMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1998), 
discussed in Thoits, supra note 20, at 323. 
 38. See Thoits, supra note 20, at 323 (examining “sympathy norms and the rules of sympathy 
exchange”). 
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numerous to fully explore here.39 The emotion cultures that develop these rules 
may be geographical, such as shame and guilt cultures. They may be temporal.40 
Notions of romantic love—what it feels like, when one ought to feel it, and for 
whom, whether it is important—shift over time and among cultures.41 
Some emotion cultures are quite localized and specific. An early and 
seminal investigation of an emotion culture and its feeling rules was Arlie 
Hochschild’s study of feeling management among flight attendants.42 As 
Hochschild showed, emotion cultures may be identified by gender and status 
hierarchy, among other variables.43 Legal institutions contain and comprise 
many overlapping “micro” emotion cultures—the culture of the courtroom or 
the jury room, for example.44 
III 
THE RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMOTION AND SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE 
When we use internal emotional processes or reciprocal private exchanges 
as the model for all emotional dynamics, we lose essential information about 
how emotion and law interact. We proceed on faulty assumptions about human 
behavior in the legal context, and about how to structure legal institutions in 
light of that behavior. These institutions, as Martha Nussbaum observes, “can 
either promote or discourage [emotions], and can [even] shape [emotions] in 
various ways.”45 This is not solely a top-down process.46 Institutional structure is 
influenced by assumptions about what people feel and ought to feel. 
For example, we have developed a thriving set of “grief industries” in the 
United States that are premised on certain assumptions (many of them 
empirically dubious) about when and how grief needs to be managed, or even 
 
 39. For excellent summaries of the work in this area, see generally id. and TURNER & STETS, supra 
note 14. 
 40. For example, American Studies professor Joel Pfister has noted that “some Western emotions, 
once deemed vital to human essence, are now obsolete (the medieval notion of “accide” or losing one’s 
zeal for praying, the Renaissance notion of melancholy).” Joel Pfister, On Conceptualizing the Cultural 
History of Emotional and Psychological Life in America, in INVENTING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL: 
TOWARD A CULTURAL HISTORY OF EMOTIONAL LIFE IN AMERICA 17, 22 (Joel Pfister & Nancy 
Schnog eds., 1997). 
 41. Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, in THE 
PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 9, at 217. 
 42. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 11, at 201–03. 
 43. Id. 
 44. No single institution operates independently, of course. To study the culture of the capital 
system implicates a web of interlocking institutions, including the criminal justice system, the jury 
system, police and prosecutors, the prison system, and the media. 
 45. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 405 
(2001) (discussing the power of institutions to influence emotions that impede appropriate 
compassion). 
 46. Id. 
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left behind.47 Similarly thriving are anger management programs, some of them 
flourishing because of referrals from the judicial system,48 though the premises 
of anger management are quite controversial generally, and particularly 
dubious in certain legal contexts.49 
On a more basic level, institutions both reflect and shape our emotional 
commitments.50 For example, institutional structures and expectations can 
channel victims’ complex and evolving needs in various directions, reflecting a 
range of attitudes toward criminality, victimization, and community.51 We 
should carefully scrutinize the costs of importing the language and assumptions 
of private, dyadic emotion into institutional contexts, rife with their own 
peculiar rules for the display and feeling of emotion, and their own range of 
influence, both practical and symbolic. 
IV 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS AND THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF GRIEF 
The incursion of the concept of closure into the legal system illustrates the 
dangers of failing to evaluate emotions and their dynamics in particular 
contexts. Closure has been imported into the legal realm without regard for the 
differences between the therapeutic, spiritual, or familial contexts and the legal 
context, or between the private and public realms. The concept has fueled the 
reshaping of the institution of capital punishment52 in significant ways: it has 
 
 47. E.g., Jerome Groopman, The Grief Industry, NEW YORKER, Jan. 26, 2004, at 30 (discussing the 
controversy over grief counseling with specific reference to families of victims of the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks). 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Bull, 214 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding the district court’s 
imposition of anger-control treatment and a requirement that the defendant pay for the treatment as 
properly falling within the statutory authorization to impose “special conditions of supervised release” 
in a case involving the unauthorized use of a VISA card); State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 
1998) (upholding the trial court’s imposition, at a parole revocation hearing, of a condition that the 
abusive father refrain from fathering any additional children until he had completed drug treatment 
and anger management programs). 
 49. See Molly Butler Bailey, Improving the Sentencing of Domestic Violence Offenders in Maine: A 
Proposal to Prohibit Anger Management Therapy, 21 MAINE B.J. 140 (2006) (noting that in Maine the 
three approved sentences for domestic violence offenders are jail time, batterer’s intervention, and 
anger management therapy; and arguing that anger management therapy is dangerous and ineffective 
in this context and should be prohibited as a sentence); Benedict Carey, Anger Management May Not 
Help at All, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at D3 (noting that state and county programs have been set up 
without supporting research on the effectiveness of anger management, even though studies show that 
the programs are often ineffective and sometimes exacerbate anger). 
 50. “Compassionate individuals construct institutions that embody what they imagine; and 
institutions, in turn, influence the development of compassion in individuals.” NUSSBAUM, supra note 
45, at 405. 
 51. See infra text accompanying notes 52–55. 
 52. Although the concept is used in noncapital contexts as well, the focus here is solely on its use in 
capital cases. Every legal context raises certain unique issues for victims and their role in the justice 
system. For example, one study of victim impact statements and their reception by judges in noncapital 
cases found that judges exhibited very different attitudes toward the appropriate expression of emotion 
by rape victims and by domestic violence victims. See generally Mary Schuster & Amy Propen, Victim 
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transformed the debate about the legitimacy of capital punishment, and it has 
led to significant changes in the administration of the capital system. These 
changes are part of a feedback loop. Survivors have been promised that they 
will feel closure, and come to expect that they will and should feel it. Legal 
actors have come to believe they should help deliver it. And it has become 
conventional wisdom that the capital system must be perpetuated in order to 
continue to provide it. 
In the capital context, the shift to the therapeutic is identifiable in changes 
both ideological and concrete. It began with the efforts of victims’ rights 
advocates to gain reforms in the treatment of victims and survivors.53 When 
crime victims organize to combat their marginalized status and the lack of 
dignity they are accorded in the criminal justice system, they might pursue a 
number of goals. Reform of the treatment of victims in court is the most 
obvious place to begin. Beyond that, there is much divergence. Organizers’ 
efforts might coalesce around restorative efforts like counseling and support 
programs, crime prevention initiatives, or victim–offender mediation. 
Alternatively (or in addition), they might coalesce around demands for 
retributive measures, such as more punitive sanctions and restrictions of 
defendants’ civil liberties.54 As criminologist Vanessa Barker found in a recent 
comparative study of victims’ rights movements in California and Washington,55 
the directions such reform movements take and the goals they seek are heavily 
influenced by the political and institutional structure in which they take shape.56 
 
Impact Statements in Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Cases; Judicial Reaction (presented at 
Law and Society Association Annual Conference, July 8, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
Law and Contemporary Problems). The capital system raises a number of unique issues, most obviously 
the role of survivors in the system and the fact that the defendant may be executed. 
 53. See generally Douglas E. Beloof et al., Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as 
Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282 (2003). See also Elizabeth Beck et al., Seeking Sanctuary: 
Interviews with Family Members of Capital Defendants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 382, 387–90 (2003) 
(describing the victims’ rights movement). 
 54. I have argued elsewhere that although victims often set out to gain the former set of goals, in 
our current adversary structure they tend to succeed mostly in attaining the latter. Susan Bandes, 
Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331 (1999). 
 55. Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Pain: A Political Institutionalist Analysis of Crime Victims’ 
Moral Protests, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 619 (2007). Barker concludes that political structures that were 
intensively polarized tended to deepen crime victims’ demands for vengeance and provide legal 
expression for those demands, whereas political contexts with intensive civic engagement and well 
developed norms of social trust and reciprocity tended to bring about pragmatic measures mixing 
restorative and restrictive approaches. Id. at 638. 
 56. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider fully the complex interaction of social, cultural, 
political, and legal forces that account for the evolution of the capital system in the United States 
generally, or the increasing influence of the victims’ rights movement in particular. For influential 
explorations of these issues, see generally STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (2003); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE 
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 
(2007); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE 
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2005); ZIMRING, supra note 2. 
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The most significant reform attained by the nascent victims’ rights 
movement in the United States in the early 1980s was the introduction of the 
victim impact statement, a vehicle now in use in federal capital trials and in 
thirty-one of the thirty-five57 capital states, which allows survivors to testify to 
the harm caused by the murder. In Payne v. Tennessee,58 the Supreme Court 
upheld the use of these statements in capital cases in the face of an Eighth 
Amendment challenge, concluding that they provide useful information to the 
jury at the sentencing phase.59 The Court held that the statements give juries a 
fuller picture of the harm caused,60 and make salient the unique individuality of 
the victim, illustrating why his death represented “a unique loss to society and 
in particular to his family.”61 
Gradually, the public act of conveying information about the victim, 
remembering the uniqueness of the victim, and describing the pain of the 
victim’s loss, has been recast as a way for the survivor to move toward healing 
and closure.62 The theme of the courtroom as a place for closure or catharsis has 
become explicit in the years since Payne. Lower courts explicitly invoke the 
importance of closure.63 Victim assistance programs often advise survivors to 
testify as part of the healing process.64 Once survivors are promised this 
 
 57. Compare Death Penalty Information Center, Facts About the Death Penalty, http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited June 27, 2009), with Death Penalty Information 
Center, States That Allow Victim Impact Statements, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legal-issues-
states-allow-victim-impact-statements (last visited June 27, 2009). 
 58. 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)). 
 59. Id. at 822. This is a topic I’ve visited before. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim 
Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996). In that article I examined the arguments against the 
original premise for upholding the use of victim impact statements—specifically, their informational 
value. The question that concerned the Court then was whether these statements would allow death 
sentences to be imposed based on improper or irrelevant factors. My focus in this article is mainly on 
the shift in rationales, and the use of the healing and closure rationale. But it is also on what we have 
learned in the nearly twenty years since Payne was decided, and on what we still need to learn, both 
about the actual workings of victim impact statements, and about emotion, cognition, and institutions. 
 60. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Justice O’Connor touched on the idea that the statement is for the benefit of the victim in her 
concurrence in Payne when she said, “Murder is the ultimate act of depersonalization. It transforms a 
living person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special and 
unique about the person. The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that 
back.” Id. at 832 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As Robert Mosteller observes, “The argument is styled in 
terms of returning something to the murder victims themselves, but obviously that action is symbolic. 
Its impact is for the benefit of the victims’ families and friends . . . .” Robert P. Mosteller, Victim Impact 
Evidence: Hard to Find the Real Rules, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 543, 550 (2003). 
 63. See cases cited supra note 8. As I will discuss in detail below, attaining closure has come to 
implicate not only the survivor’s ability to be heard, but also the need for a sentence of death and an 
execution. See infra text accompanying notes 100–110. 
 64. See, e.g., Victim Impact Statements, http://www.letswrap.com/legal/impact.htm (last visited Oct. 
19, 2008). This website, a summary of information on victim impact statements from the Minnesota 
Center for Crime Victim Services, argues that statements provide victims a right to address the court 
prior to sentencing, allow them to express the impact of the crime on them and their families, and may 
aid victims in their emotional recovery. See also Mary Lay Schuster & Amy Propen, 2006 WATCH 
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opportunity to heal, the decision to exclude their testimony becomes, not 
merely an evaluation of the information value of the statement, but an act 
fraught with emotional meaning.65 
We are witnessing a confusion or conflation of cultures—the therapeutic 
and the legal; a mapping of the language of private grief onto an entirely 
different sort of emotion culture—collective, public, hierarchical, adversarial, 
coercive. The emotional dynamics of the capital trial in fact bear little 
resemblance to those of private expressions of grief. The dynamics of this 
emotional interchange are comprehensible only in light of its social and 
institutional context. If we read out the social and collective aspects of these 
dynamics, we miss information that is crucial to the operation of the capital 
system and to its ability to provide just processes and outcomes for survivors, 
defendants, and the community. 
To treat the victim impact statement like a private or familial expression of 
grief is to ignore the ways in which the survivor’s message is channeled, 
translated, even transformed in light of the expression rules and role 
expectations of the forum. The extrapolation from the private realm also elides 
the competing agendas that come into play when a survivor gives victim impact 
testimony in a capital trial. Specifically, the survivor may find herself in conflict 
with or in reluctant collaboration with a prosecutorial agenda that affects her 
own autonomy. Moreover, the audience for the victim impact statement—at 
least the only audience with any power to act on the information conveyed—is a 
collective entity: the penalty-phase jury. 
To understand how each individual juror reads the emotional content of the 
testimony, how these interpretations change once the jury deliberates, and how 
the jury as a collective body translates its responses into action requires an 
understanding of how emotions develop in group settings in general, and in the 
particular setting of the capital trial. And if we confuse the expression of grief at 
a capital trial with the grief expressed in a familial or therapeutic setting, we 
miss the point of the whole exercise. The penalty-phase capital jury has only 
two possible ways to respond to the expression of grief—it can sentence the 
defendant to death, or not. 
Finally, if we view victim impact evidence apart from its institutional 
context, we miss the feedback loop. We fail to consider the ways in which 
assumptions about grief, healing, and closure are affected by the capital system, 
and the ways in which the system in turn is shaped by assumptions about these 
emotions. 
To have an informed and constructive debate about the use of victim impact 
statements or the role of the justice system in promoting closure, it is essential 
to focus on how context affects the meaning of psychological terms. It is also 
 
Victim Impact Statement Study 6, http://www.watchmn.org/pdf/watch-vis%20Final%20.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2008) (“Judges and advocates were generally in agreement that the impact statement can be a 
powerful ‘part of the healing process’ for the victim.”). 
 65. See discussion of the McVeigh case infra text accompanying notes 111–19. 
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essential not to lose sight of the particular requisites of the legal context at 
hand—a system of capital punishment governed by constitutional standards. 
The capital context gives rise to a particular and in some respects unique set of 
risks, which cannot be weighed solely in light of the possible therapeutic value 
of victim impact statements to survivors. There are risks to survivors. Some 
survivors may benefit from the ability to participate, and some may feel co-
opted or re-victimized by the process.66 There are also significant risks to the 
capital defendant, who is entitled to a jury whose decision about whether to 
take or spare his life is based on constitutionally acceptable criteria.67 
V 
THE ROLE OF THE SURVIVOR IN THE CAPITAL SYSTEM 
For the survivor, the trial is a poor vehicle for authentic expression of 
emotion.68 It is, unavoidably, a ritualized public performance, with particular 
scripts, conventions, and role expectations. For example, there are pressures for 
the statement to conform to certain stock expectations69 about victimhood. 
Murder survivors are not a monolithic group with identical emotions and 
perspectives.70 Moreover, individual survivors may find that while some 
emotions will never abate, others might diminish or intensify over time.71 
 
 66. See Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know About Victim Impact Statements, 2 
UTAH L. REV. 545, 551–52 (1999) (citing studies on victim satisfaction and noting a lack of studies on 
the psychological effects of victim impact statements on murder survivors); Robert C. Davis & Barbara 
E. Smith, Victim Impact Statements and Victim Satisfaction: An Unfulfilled Promise?, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 
1 (1994) (analyzing noncapital felony cases and finding little evidence that victim impact statements 
promote victim satisfaction); Robert Elias, The Law of Personhood: A Review of Markus Dirk 
Dubber’s Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims’ Rights, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 225, 246 
(2004) (arguing that encouraging victims and survivors to voice hatred may increase the sense of 
victimization). 
 67. This is not to suggest that the constitutional criteria are clear, or that their interpretation is free 
of controversy—quite the contrary. 
 68. In general the extent to which it is possible to discern the authentic emotional states of others is 
itself a “formidable epistemological problem.” See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the 
Retributive Emotions, and the ‘Clumsy Moral Philosophy’ of Jesus Christ, in BANDES, supra note 9, at 
157 (discussing the problem of other minds); see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, Remorse, Apology, and Mercy, 
4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 423, 437 (2007) (“[I]issues of deep character are matters about which the state is 
probably incompetent to judge.”). 
 69. See, e.g., GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL, supra note 35, at 48–50 (discussing the rules of 
conduct for the presentation of self in particular roles); see also MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN 
THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 188–92 (2002) (discussing stock 
images of victims). 
 70. For discussions of the many variations among victims and survivors, see, for example, WOUNDS 
THAT DO NOT BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 17–140 (James R. 
Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006); Bandes, supra note 59, at 405–08; Susan Bandes, When Victims 
Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599 
(2000); Wayne A. Logan, Declaring Life at the Crossroads of Death: Victims’ Anti-Death Penalty Views 
and Prosecutors’ Charging Decisions, 19 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41, 48 (1999). For discussions of murder 
survivors who oppose the death penalty, see, for example, Robert Renny Cushing & Susannah Sheffer, 
DIGNITY DENIED: THE EXPERIENCE OF MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILY MEMBERS WHO OPPOSE THE 
DEATH PENALTY (2002). See also Brief for Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation as Amici 
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At most, the victim impact statement is a snapshot of feeling at a particular 
juncture. But it is a distorted snapshot of that feeling. Ambiguity is not easily 
accommodated. The statement is often drafted from a template. For example, 
the Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) victim impact statement 
workbook provides both a template for drafting the statement and a set of 
guidelines on the acceptable expression of emotion.72 It instructs victims and 
survivors to “write and speak from the heart about . . . [their] pain.”73 Yet it also 
instructs them not to vent their anger: “Your goal is to express your hurt and 
your pain; not to blame.”74 Like ambiguity, evolution of feeling is also difficult 
to accommodate. The emotions the survivor expresses during capital sentencing 
may change over time, but it is unlikely there will be another forum in which to 
express these changed feelings. Sometimes survivors come to regret their role in 
the imposition of a capital sentence.75 
Moreover, as sociologist Nick Tavuchis observed in the context of apology, 
once the speech goes public, it implicates others with interests and 
commitments of their own.76 The survivor preparing to give victim impact 
testimony generally works with the prosecutor’s office, or with victim-mediation 
 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at *8, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 
1588549 (discussing survivors’ views on the juvenile death penalty). 
 71. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims’ Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 964–66 (1985) 
(discussing the evolution of emotions after victimization). 
 72. The MADD workbook asks a series of questions to assist victims in drafting their statements. 
Here is one example: 
The Emotional Impact 
How do you feel emotionally when you wake up in the morning? What do you think about? 
How often do you cry? Describe the last time you cried. What do you think about when you 
go to bed at night? How difficult is it for you to sleep? How long do you sleep? Do you have 
nightmares? About how much of every day do you feel sad? Do you feel more tired than you 
did before the crime? Have you been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, or any other stress-related illness since the crime? Are you on any medications 
for those conditions? Have you considered suicide since the crime? Have you had difficulties 
with relationships since the crime? How has it affected your family life? Has your view of the 
world as a safe and fair place changed since the crime? Has your spirituality changed since the 
crime? 
MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, YOUR VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT 9 (2003), available at 
http://www.madd.org/docs/Victim%20Impact%20Statement%20Workbook.pdf. 
 73. Id. at 28. 
 74. Id. at 5. 
 75. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH?: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 
THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END OF EXECUTIONS 204–10 (2002) (describing some cases in 
which survivors who began by supporting a death sentence came, for a variety of complex reasons, to 
oppose or regret the execution of the condemned man); see also Brief for Murder Victims’ Families for 
Reconciliation as Amici Curiae, supra note 70, at *8 (“Execution of the offender causes some victims to 
feel implicated in another person’s death.”); Jeff Goodell, Letting Go of McVeigh, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
May 13, 2001, at 40 (recounting the change of heart of Patrick Reeder, who lost his wife and mother-in-
law in the Oklahoma City bombing). 
 76. NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 51 
(1991). 
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agencies that are themselves working with the prosecutor.77 The prosecutor has 
traditionally possessed tremendous and often unbridled discretion about who 
may give such a statement. Thus, for example, prosecutors have on a number of 
occasions barred survivors who oppose the death penalty78 from testifying,79 as 
the McVeigh prosecutors did when they refused to allow the testimony of 
several such survivors, including Marsha Kight, whose daughter was killed in 
the Oklahoma City bombing.80 Even when prosecutors do not silence survivors, 
they may explicitly or implicitly communicate their own views about which 
emotions are appropriate to the occasion.81 Often these “appropriate” emotions, 
such as anger and a desire for vengeance, may increase the possibility of a death 
sentence.82 To assume that the survivor’s testimony is an authentic and 
therapeutic expression of emotion is to discount the real possibility that the 
prosecution’s agenda may overwhelm the survivor’s voice. 
 
 77. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Speeding in Reverse: An Anecdotal View of Why Victim Impact Testimony 
Should Not Be Driving Capital Prosecutions, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 559 (2003). 
 78. In Payne, the Supreme Court did not rule on the admissibility of survivor opinion testimony 
about the proper sentence in capital cases, a type of testimony that was previously held 
unconstitutional. Although the denial of survivor opinion testimony might appear to apply to both pro- 
and anti-death penalty opinions, there are two reasons why this may not be so. First, judges appear 
more willing to allow “thinly veiled pro-death-penalty opinions,” such as exhortations to the jury to 
“show no mercy,” testimony that the Nevada Supreme Court allowed, characterizing it as “a request 
that the jury return the most serious sentence it found appropriate.” Wayne Logan, Victim Impact 
Evidence in Federal Capital Trials, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 8 (citing Witter v. State, 921 P.2d 885, 895–96 
(Nev. 1996)). Compare this with Robison v. Maynard, 943 F. 2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1991), in which the 
Tenth Circuit upheld the exclusion of testimony of a survivor who planned to ask for mercy, 
characterizing it as opinion testimony. Second, as discussed below, testimony that does not bear the 
hallmarks of a death penalty opponent, such as a plea for mercy or forgiveness, tends to be received by 
the jury as a plea to impose a death sentence. See infra text accompanying notes 127–30. 
 79. Bandes, supra note 54, at 341 & n.45. Charles Baird and Elizabeth McGinn describe several 
such cases, including one in which the prosecutor sought to bar the mother of a murdered six-year-old 
boy both from giving a victim impact statement and from taking the stand at all, though he put her 
brother, a death penalty supporter, on the stand. Charles F. Baird & Elizabeth E. McGinn, Re-
Victimizing the Victim: How Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion Are Being Exercised to Silence 
Victims Who Oppose Capital Punishment, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 466 (2004). 
 80. The federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006), was passed to address this 
problem and to protect federal crime victims’ rights to be heard. See A Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. J. 
Res. 6, 105th Cong. 70 (1997) (testimony of Marsha Kight). There are numerous unresolved questions 
about the scope and operation of the Act. However, it specifically states that it does not establish 
grounds for an independent cause of action based on its violation. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). It further 
states that “nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the 
Attorney General or any officer under his direction.” Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Cushing & Sheffer, supra note 70, at 12–13 (discussing implicit messages to survivors 
that their feelings are inappropriate); see also LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 75, at 204 (discussing 
the impact on a survivor of prosecution encouragement of her “anger and hatred”). 
 82. See Kelly v. California, 555 U.S. __, No. 07-11073, slip op. at 5 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (observing that victim impact statements elicit emotions that are likely to 
increase the chance of a death sentence); DUBBER, supra note 69, at 188–89 (analyzing the role of 
victims’ emotions in prosecution strategy); Baird & McGinn, supra note 79, at 464–65 (discussing 
concern about the ability of judges to withstand victim impact testimony at sentencing). 
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In a private setting, moreover, an outpouring of sorrow would elicit a 
reaction, such as comfort or sympathy. In a truly therapeutic setting, it would 
elicit a response from someone trained to help. In a social setting it would be 
strange and cruel for such an expression to be met with silence, yet in the 
courtroom there is usually no response. Indeed, when judges do attempt to 
respond, they often prove ill-equipped to do so. For example, they may display 
discomfort or, on occasion, inappropriate reactions in response to the display of 
emotion, or particular emotions.83 The victim impact statement, then, is quite 
unlike a private outpouring of grief. It is better likened to a cathartic public 
ritual. Yet for the survivor, there is no good evidence that giving victim impact 
testimony provides catharsis, healing, or closure.84 
VI 
CLOSURE AND THE CULTURE OF THE CAPITAL TRIAL 
The legal use of the concept of closure raises all the aforementioned 
problems about importing concepts from the therapeutic to the legal context. 
However, even in the therapeutic context, the term “closure” has no accepted 
clinical psychological meaning. As I noted earlier, despite its lack of bona fides, 
closure has been enthusiastically embraced as a legitimate psychological state 
and, moreover, as a state that the legal system ought to help victims and 
survivors attain. 
Most of us cannot know how we would react if we were to lose a loved one 
to murder, and therefore 
we ought to be very slow to judge what any particular individual in that position ought 
to feel or want. 
 
 83. See Schuster & Propen, supra note 64, at 9–10. Schuster and Propen reported, in the context of 
victim impact testimony in noncapital cases, that judges were often uncomfortable with negative 
emotions like anger and hatred, for example. Id. They stated, 
While we observed several sentencing hearings in which judges made an extra effort to 
welcome, thank, or even praise the victim, we did see one in which we wished the judge had 
made more effort. The court waited a long time for the defendant, who was in custody for 
murdering his wife, to be brought into court, and the judge was clearly concerned about 
getting back to a trial that he was conducting. After the advocate read statements from the 
step-father and mother of the victim, the judge’s only comment was “ok.” The attack was 
particularly brutal, so much so that the sentence was an upward departure from the guidelines. 
We imagined that it would be hard for the victim’s family, who sat in the gallery, to interpret 
just what that “ok” meant. Id. 
They also recounted instances in which judges were inattentive or rude to victims. Id. at 21–23; see also 
Wayne Logan, Confronting Evil: Victims’ Rights in an Age of Terror, 96 GEO. L.J. 721, 769 (2008) 
(recounting disturbing stories of patronizing and dismissive judicial reactions to accounts of victim 
suffering). 
 84. LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 75, at 204; Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, 
Exploring “Closure” and the Ultimate Penal Sanction for Survivors of Homicide Victims, 19 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 105, 110 (2006); Article 3, NEWSL. MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMS. FOR HUM. RTS. (Murder 
Victims’ Fams. for Hum. Rts., Cambridge, Mass.), Newsletter 7, Fall 2008/Winter 2009 (issue on 
“closure”). 
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 But there is a separate question: the question of the law’s proper role in helping 
victims or survivors achieve the closure they need. This is where we do need to judge, 
and to decide. And where it becomes important to at least try to untangle what one’s 
religion might urge, from what psychiatry might try to achieve, from what politics 
might dictate, and all of those from what the law can . . . even attempt to accomplish.85 
When the capital system is conscripted as a means of providing the elusive 
state of closure, the ambiguities of the term become dangerous. If it refers to 
catharsis only, then perhaps the mere giving of a victim impact statement is 
enough. If it is aided by information from the defendant about what happened 
and why, a different set of questions is posed. In the courtroom, this quest for 
answers might be reduced to watching the defendant’s demeanor and trying to 
read his reactions.86 If it requires a reaction from third parties, it becomes 
important to clarify what sort of reaction is required, and from whom, and 
whether it is the sort of reaction a capital trial can or should provide. If it 
requires a more expeditious verdict, sentence, or execution, this raises a host of 
questions about due process. 
Placing this emotional exchange in its institutional context is crucial. In the 
particular context of the capital trial, the response to the survivor’s outpouring 
of grief can come from only one source: the penalty-phase jury. And how does 
the jury interpret what it hears? This question cannot be usefully considered if 
the jury is treated as a collection of individuals, each reacting to the survivor’s 
story. The jury becomes its own micro emotion culture, with its own ideologies 
about appropriate attitudes, feelings, and responses. As psychologist Craig 
Haney observed about the capital jury, 
The courtroom becomes the jurors’ separate reality, and they spend weeks or months 
in this legal world, amateurs in an arena of experts. Like all people in unfamiliar and 
threatening situations, they become acutely sensitive to—and highly dependent 
upon—the social cues and implicit messages they receive from the legal experts 
around them.87 
Emotion is deeply implicated in decisionmaking. It helps us choose which 
sources of information we will emphasize. It assists us in evaluating the 
intentions or credibility of others. It helps us decide what is important and 
valuable. It motivates us to take action.88 Jurors make all these judgments in a 
collective context, in which they use emotion to assess not only the trial 
 
 85. Bandes, supra note 70, at 1601–02. 
 86. Similarly, survivors may seek understanding from watching the defendant’s demeanor as he is 
executed, as occurred during the execution of Timothy McVeigh. See CNN.com, Witnesses Describe 
McVeigh’s Last Moments, http://premium.edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/11/mcveigh.witnesses/ (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2008). See generally Jody Lynnee Madeira, Blood Relations: Collective Memory, 
Cultural Trauma, and the Prosecution and Execution of Timothy McVeigh, 45 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 
75 (analyzing the importance to survivors and others of watching Timothy McVeigh’s face as he was 
executed). Another possible venue for this attempt to gain understanding is victim–offender mediation. 
The difficult questions that arise from a survivor’s attempt to gain understanding in this way deserve in-
depth treatment that is beyond the scope of this article. 
 87. Craig Haney, Lorelie Sontag & Sally Constanzo, Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries, 
Sentencing Instructions, and the Jurisprudence of Death, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 149, 151 (1994). 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 28–32. 
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unfolding before them, but the dynamics of the jury room itself. Jurors make 
judgments about whom to trust, whom to attend to, and with whom to 
empathize, and they make these judgments as a collective body. They appraise 
witnesses, they watch the defendant’s demeanor carefully—trying to assess his 
level of remorse, for example, or the fear he elicits in them. They appraise one 
another, and they often make these appraisals across racial, ethnic, and other 
divides, without realizing that these divides may cause them to misread 
demeanor and to misjudge emotion.89 They form social bonds, cliques, and out-
groups.90 They experience a very intense form of emotional contagion: they 
enter into collective moods,91 some more amenable to open and effective 
deliberation than others.92 We miss all of these variables if we think about 
emotion shorn of its social context. 
The emotional dynamics of victim impact statements are only beginning to 
receive careful study. We need more information about the emotions these 
statements evoke in both survivors and jurors and the effect of these emotions 
on sentencing. Given how much there is to learn generally about group 
emotion, there is a particular need to focus on how victim impact statements 
affect the emotions of the jury as a collective entity. There is some evidence that 
victim impact evidence, particularly when it conveys intense emotional pain, 
evokes sympathy and anger in jurors.93 Jurors perceive greater suffering after 
hearing such statements, and hear the emotional intensity of the statements as 
 
 89. For example, one study found that white jurors interpreted the demeanor of black defendants 
quite differently (and more harshly) than black jurors did: where a black juror saw remorse and 
sincerity, a white juror saw incorrigibility and deceptiveness. Black and white jurors displayed similar 
differences in reading one another’s demeanors, with both black and white jurors reading more 
negative emotions across racial lines. William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death 
Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial 
Composition, 3 J. CONST. L. 171, 244–52 (2001); see also Michael E. Antonio, Arbitrariness and the 
Death Penalty: How the Defendant’s Appearance During Trial Influences Capital Jurors’ Punishment 
Decision, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (2006). 
 90. A recent, rather colorful example of this dynamic occurred in the Lewis “Scooter” Libby trial, 
in which all but one juror arrived in court on Valentine’s Day wearing “bright red T-shirts with a white 
valentine heart over their clothes . . . . [in order] to express their fondness for the judge and the court 
staff.” Neil A. Lewis, Saying He Was Misled by Defense, Judge in Libby Case Puts Some Evidence Off-
Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at A27. The lone T-shirt holdout was later dismissed from the jury 
on the ground that she had been exposed to trial-related information over the weekend. Michael J. 
Sniffen, No Verdict Yet From Remaining Libby Jury, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2007, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/26/AR2007022600586.html. 
 91. Barsade, supra note 22, at 644–75. 
 92. See generally SCOTT SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH 
PENALTY (2003) (illustrating group dynamics in the context of three actual capital jury deliberations); 
SUNWOLF, PRACTICAL JURY DYNAMICS: FROM ONE JUROR’S TRIAL PERCEPTIONS TO THE GROUP’S 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (2004) (discussing the psychological and neurological components of 
group dynamics in the jury context). See also Barsade, supra note 22, at 644–75 (discussing emotional 
contagion generally). 
 93. Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 419, 447 (2003) (mock jury study conducted through questionnaires gauging 
participant reactions to varying victim impact statements). 
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“a cry for help or relief.”94 There is some evidence that the anger they feel upon 
hearing victim impact statements translates into feelings of punitiveness.95 There 
is also evidence, more generally, that anger tends to interfere with sound 
judgment—it inhibits detailed information processing, increases tendencies to 
blame (including misattributions of blame), and exacerbates the urge to punish. 
In other words, it makes people want to punish more harshly, and makes them 
less careful about whether they are punishing the correct person.96 And there is 
some evidence, albeit far from conclusive, that this punitiveness translates into 
harsher sentences, including more death sentences,97 and that this desire to mete 
out harsh sentences is most discernible after group deliberation.98 
Thus, although the Court in Payne did not permit survivor opinion 
testimony about the appropriate sentence in capital cases,99 the actual dynamics 
of victim impact testimony reveal what message is, in fact, conveyed.100 A capital 
jury faced with pain and grief, overcome with anger, does not have many social 
options at its disposal. If it wishes to take action on its empathy toward the 
survivor, its grief at the loss of the victim, and its anger toward the defendant, its 
only apparent option is to vote for a sentence of death. 
In this way, the survivor’s expression of pain becomes implicated in the 
prosecution’s message to the jury—the message that jurors who truly feel this 
survivor’s pain, and who agree that the person he lost was unique and valuable, 
will vote to execute the defendant.101 And thus it seems to follow, according to 
this macabre logic, that for survivors, true closure will come when the defendant 
is executed, and anything that stands in the way of a speedy execution denies 
them the closure to which they are entitled. This valuation scheme may push 
survivors into a distressing dilemma. Survivors who do not support the death 
penalty may feel the need to stay off the witness stand rather than be 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 444. 
 96. Id. at 443–45; Brian Myers, Emalee Weidamen & Gregory Pierce, Psychology Weighs in on the 
Debate Surrounding Victim Impact Statements and Capital Sentencing: Are Emotional Jurors Really 
Irrational?, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 13, 16 (2006). 
 97. See Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Victim Characteristics and 
Victim Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 321–22 (2003) 
(summarizing studies). 
 98. Id. at 319 (citing Bryan Myers & Jack Arbuthnot, The Effects of Victim Impact Evidence on the 
Verdicts and Sentencing Judgments of Mock Jurors, 29 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 95, 99–100 
(1999)). 
 99. In Payne, the Supreme Court overruled Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), to the extent 
Booth held the Eighth Amendment acted as a per se bar on the introduction of two types of victim 
impact evidence: evidence characterizing the victim and evidence of the impact of the killing on the 
victim’s family. It did not discuss the admissibility of opinion evidence regarding sentence, and some 
commentators contend that therefore Booth’s bar on opinion evidence remains undisturbed. See LINDA 
E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 127 n.47, 129 
(2004). 
 100. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text (suggesting that the ban on opinion testimony 
tends to advantage the state, rather than affect both parties equally). 
 101. Nadler & Rose, supra note 93, at 447. 
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conscripted onto the prosecution team, but in doing so may be painted as (or 
may feel themselves to be) disloyal to the victim’s memory.102 For survivors who 
do believe the system’s promises about closure, another type of distress may 
occur. Survivors who do not experience the promised closure after giving 
testimony, seeing the defendant receive a death sentence, or even watching the 
defendant die (as happened, for example, to some of those who watched 
Timothy McVeigh die, watching his face in vain for a hint of the “meaning” of 
their loved ones’ deaths),103 may suffer the pain of empty promises and dashed 
hopes.104 
The valuation scheme described above exerts a profound influence on the 
structure of the capital system. It exerts pressure on legal actors down the line. 
It exerts pressure on legislators to expand the list of death eligible crimes, or 
risk showing disrespect for certain classes of victims.105 It exerts pressure on 
politicians to “streamline” the capital system, for example by closing or 
truncating avenues of appeal.106 It exerts pressure on prosecutors to bring capital 
charges, particularly in high-profile cases,107 and even to resist reopening a case 
based on evidence tending to exonerate the defendant.108 It exerts pressure on 
jurors to impose a death sentence. It exerts pressure on judges to deny 
 
 102. John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 257, 280 (2003); see also ANNALISE ACORN, COMPULSORY COMPASSION: A CRITIQUE OF 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 59 (2004) (noting that performance rituals may amount to “a demonstration of 
power relations . . . [in which] everyone is forced to either participate or watch silently”). 
 103. See sources cited supra note 86; see also Susan Jacoby, Watching McVeigh Die Helps No One, 
NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 2001, at A33. 
 104. Some have called this experience “secondary victimization” by the criminal justice system. E.g., 
Deborah Kelley, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, in VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, 
POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 172, 182 (Arthur J. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990); DEBORAH SPUNGEN, 
HOMICIDE: THE HIDDEN VICTIMS 10–11 (1998). 
 105. Scott Turow, To Kill or Not to Kill: Coming to Terms with Capital Punishment, NEW YORKER, 
Jan. 6, 2003, at 40 (“[T]he fundamental equality of each survivor’s loss creates an inevitable emotional 
momentum to expand the categories for death penalty eligibility.”). 
 106. Former Florida governor Jeb Bush stated that by introducing lethal injection and truncating 
certain procedural avenues to speed up appeals, “we can finally put an end to the unnecessary and 
endless delays long associated with death penalty cases in Florida. It is time to bring justice to the 
families of victims who have suffered and died at the hands of the most heinous criminals.” Amnesty 
Int’l, USA (Florida): Further Information on Death Penalty, A.I. Index 51/016/2000, Jan. 24, 2000 
(quoting Governor Jeb Bush); see also Governor Jeb Bush’s Statements Before the Special Session of the 
Florida State Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2001, at A22. 
 107. For example, when District Attorney Jim Brazelton announced that he was bringing capital 
charges against Scott Peterson, he said: “I owe it to Laci, Conner, the community, and especially the 
family, who are the most important people here.” Harriet Chiang, How Prosecutors Choose Death 
Penalty, SAN. FRAN. CHRON. April 24, 2003, at A1. For studies documenting wide disparities in capital 
charging decisions, see STATE OF ILLINOIS RYAN COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S 
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Recommendation 30 (April 15, 2002); James Liebman et al., 
A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases and What Can Be Done About 
It, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/updatedinfo.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). 
 108. See generally Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 
49 HOWARD L.J. 475 (2006). 
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continuances or appeals.109 In general, it casts closure as an entitlement the court 
is eager to protect and casts appeals, stays, post-conviction petitions, and other 
procedural safeguards, as well as grants of clemency,110 as cruel barriers to 
closure. 
VII 
SURVIVOR EVIDENCE IN MASS KILLING CASES 
The use of victim impact evidence in criminal cases arising from terrorist 
attacks in which large numbers of people have been killed (mass killing cases) 
raises another set of questions about the effect of context on emotional 
dynamics. Many of the difficult issues that arose during the McVeigh111 and 
Moussaoui112 trials, among others, were the result of ambiguities about victim 
impact testimony that courts have struggled with in capital trials generally: 
What is its purpose? Who counts as a victim? What sorts of harm are 
admissible? What is the court’s role in ensuring the testimony is not unduly 
prejudicial? These issues have generated a voluminous literature, which will not 
be revisited here. The focus in this section is on how the mass killing context not 
only amplifies or exacerbates existing ambiguities about victim testimony, but 
affects the emotional dynamics of the capital trial in ways that pose unique 
institutional challenges. 
As a general matter, high-profile and politically charged mass killing 
prosecutions, like the McVeigh and Moussaoui trials, vividly showcase the 
public, performative aspects of victim impact testimony. Likewise, these trials 
demonstrate the host of often-conflicting legal, social, and political interests, 
pressures, and agendas implicated in the struggle over who gets to shape the 
presentation of victim impact testimony, and what form it will take. More 
specifically, the mass killing cases place in sharp relief the basic question raised 
 
 109. See., e.g., cases cited supra note 8. For discussions of the political pressures on judges in capital 
cases more generally, and the effects of those pressures on judicial behavior, see Stephen B. Bright & 
Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next 
Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995); Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in 
Covering and Shaping the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585 (2004). 
 110. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan’s commutation of the sentences of all but four 
(pardoned) death-row inmates to life in prison followed a series of highly emotional hearings on the 
prisoners’ clemency petitions. The hearings were requested by the Illinois State’s Attorney’s Office. 
The issue of closure was raised often: both murder victims’ families and the press decried the hearings 
themselves for reopening painful wounds, and pled with the governor not to deprive survivors and the 
public of the closure of execution. See John Patterson, Clemency Hearings Open Old Wounds, CHI. 
DAILY HERALD, Oct. 15, 2002, at 1; Editorial, Ryan’s Hearings Cruel and Unusual, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Oct. 22, 2002, at 27; see also DEADLINE (Home Vision Entertainment 2004) (chronicling the Ryan 
clemency hearings). The film includes the testimony of Robert Jones, father of a murdered girl: “It 
would be a grave insult to our daughter for the governor to grant clemency.” See generally AUSTIN 
SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO STOP AN EXECUTION (2005). 
 111. United States v. McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo. 1997), aff’d 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
 112. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
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earlier: What purpose are victim impact statements meant to serve? The 
ambiguity about their proper role complicates the effort to use them wisely in 
these highly charged cases. 
Perhaps, as Payne itself held, victim impact statements are meant to 
transmit information.113 If so, courts should guard against redundant testimony. 
However, to determine redundancy it is necessary to discuss what sorts of 
information victim impact statements are meant to convey. Victim impact 
testimony is not meant to convey the fact of the murder—that is established in 
the guilt phase. It conveys the emotional impact of losing the particular victim. 
The informational value of this sort of testimony is difficult to assess. Payne 
premises the right to give victim impact testimony on the importance of 
conveying the uniqueness of each victim,114 and the Court has more generally 
acknowledged the informational importance of narrative accounts.115 Thus, 
arguably, since each victim is unique, and each narrative account will convey 
information more vividly than a cold evidentiary record, each survivor should 
be permitted to give a statement. Defense attorneys have argued in response 
that every loss of life is terrible and leaves devastation, and that at some point 
the testimony becomes duplicative.116 This argument has been predictably futile. 
But in these cases it is administratively impractical to permit each of those 
affected to testify. In the Moussaoui case, for example, the government created 
a database of 8000 persons adversely affected by the attacks of September 11th, 
and several hundred of them expressed an interest in testifying at the 
sentencing hearing.117 Ultimately the government had to confine itself to what it 
called “a reasonable sample . . . to convey properly the devastation.”118 Three 
dozen people were permitted to give victim impact statements.119 
The mass killing cases highlight difficulties of drawing the line between 
informational and prejudicial victim impact statements. The distinction borders 
on the incoherent in the victim impact context generally, given that the value of 
the information is its ability to evoke pain and make grief salient. The Supreme 
Court recently declined an opportunity to clarify this distinction, denying 
certiorari in a case involving victim impact testimony in the form of an 
emotionally powerful film about the life of the victim, including music, a 
 
 113. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (describing victim impact evidence as “simply 
another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the 
crime in question”). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188–89 (1997) (recognizing the power of 
narrative). 
 116. Logan, supra note 83, at 744 (citing Transcript of Record at 6809–11, United States v. Usama 
Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). 
 117. Logan, supra note 83, at 750 (discussing victim impact statements in the Moussaoui case). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. As Logan notes, in order to exclude all but three dozen impact witnesses, the government 
needed to obtain an exception to the Justice for All Act, which normally allows crime victims to be 
reasonably heard at any public proceeding concerning sentence. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a)–(d). 
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voiceover by the victim’s mother, and a concluding shot of wild horses running 
free. Justices Breyer and Stevens, in their separate opinions dissenting from the 
denial of certiorari, each quoted a federal district court judge who said: 
I cannot help but wonder if Payne would have been decided the same way if the 
Supreme Court Justices in the majority had ever sat as trial judges in a federal death 
penalty case and had observed first hand, rather than through review of a cold record, 
the unsurpassed emotional power of victim impact testimony on a jury. It has now 
been over four months since I heard this testimony and the juror’s sobbing during the 
victim impact testimony still rings in my ears.120 
In mass killing trials, it is difficult to imagine a metric for determining the 
point at which the possible prejudicial effect of the emotions evoked by the 
information outweighs the value of the information.121 Payne and its progeny 
assume that victim testimony will not interfere with the jury’s constitutional 
duty to consider the defendant’s mitigating evidence122 before determining 
whether he deserves to die.123 But as Judge Matsch learned in McVeigh, it is 
immensely difficult to regulate the emotional climate of the courtroom in a 
high-profile, mass killing case. Despite his expressed intention to limit victim 
impact evidence to “facts rather than emotional impact,”124 he eventually 
permitted more than three dozen victim impact statements. As one 
commentator noted, “The ‘grieving process’ . . . and the compelling emotional 
need for witnesses to pay homage to their loved ones and to find some way of 
sharing their intense pain—rolled over everyone.”125 The effect of the testimony 
was so powerful that even the judge and the reporters wept.126 
 
 120. United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1107 (N.D. Iowa 2005), cited in Kelly v. 
California, 555 U.S. __, No. 07-11073, slip op. at 2 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) and at 6 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 121. The very difficulty of raising the issue of prejudice without appearing heartless illustrates the 
challenge of regulating impact testimony, particularly in mass killing cases. In an exchange from one 
mass murder trial, the defense counsel, seeking to limit victim testimony, apologized for “seeking to 
minimize in a legal sense what cannot be minimized in a human sense.” The judge dismissed his plea for 
balance, saying “What is a fair balance? Two hundred killed and 5,000 injured and what is the calculus 
of that?” Logan, supra note 70, at 743–44 (citing Transcript of Record at 6809–11, United States v. 
Usama Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). 
 122. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that sentencing structure must give effect to 
mitigating evidence); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (holding that a sentencer must consider 
mitigation testimony); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that individualized sentencing in 
capital cases is constitutionally required); see also Bandes, supra note 59, at 402–05 (discussing the 
influence of victim impact testimony on a jury’s ability to consider mitigation evidence). 
 123. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (assuming that the due process clause would 
provide a mechanism for relief in the event of unduly prejudicial testimony); see also John H. Blume, 
Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 257 (2003) 
(reviewing post-Payne cases and finding little meaningful effort to regulate victim impact testimony). 
 124. Richard Burr, Litigating with Victim Impact Testimony: The Serendipity that Has Come from 
Payne v. Tennessee, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 520 (2003) (quoting statements made by Judge Matsch 
during an in-chambers conference on proposed victim impact testimony). 
 125. Id. at 521; see also Susan Bandes, Letter to the Editor: For McVeigh’s Victims, A Spectrum of 
Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A22. 
 126. Burr, supra note 124, at 521; see also Logan, supra note 83, at 743. Although McVeigh was 
sentenced to death, Moussaoui was not. There is no definitive explanation for the Moussaoui 
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If, on the other hand, victim impact statements are meant to serve as a 
vehicle for healing and catharsis, the exclusion of any single survivor’s 
testimony becomes problematic for a different reason. Once the ability to make 
a statement is held out as a gesture of respect for victims and a means toward 
healing for survivors, the exclusion of any survivor comes to seem a cruel 
withholding—both of respect for the value of the victim’s life, and of the 
survivor’s means of achieving closure. 
The alternative to letting all survivors testify is to choose among survivors. 
There is an irony here. “[The] victims’ rights movement revives the concept of 
privatized justice, by portraying the criminal case as a struggle between the 
defendant and the victim’s family and by seeming to erase the role of the 
state.”127 One perhaps unintended consequence of viewing the crime as a harm 
to individuals rather than to the community as a whole is that it raises the 
question of which individuals will be given a forum. If only some survivors will 
be permitted to testify, which victims will get to be remembered, and which 
survivors will get to be heard? The situation is rife with pitfalls. In McVeigh, the 
prosecutors excluded several survivors who opposed a death sentence, whereas 
in Moussaoui, survivors with a range of attitudes toward the death penalty were 
permitted to testify.128 Nevertheless, even in the latter case, hundreds of 
survivors who wanted to testify were precluded from taking the stand.129 
More basically, the very question of who qualifies as a victim or a survivor is 
ambiguous. This ambiguity is not confined to the mass killing cases,130 but their 
circumstances do exacerbate it. For example, Moussaui made liberal use of the 
anthropomorphic notion of “institutional victims,” permitting medical rescue 
workers, police, fire personnel, and former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani 
to talk about harms to their workplaces, to the City of New York, to the U.S. 
government, and to the nation as a whole.131 One survivor who lost her husband 
asked, “Why Mayor Giuliani? I don’t think he needs closure, and he didn’t lose 
 
sentencing decision. Several jurors attributed it to the government’s weak case. Three of the jurors 
attributed it to Moussaoui’s limited knowledge of the September 11th plot, and three to his minor role 
in the attacks. See Moussaoui Spared Execution but Is Sentenced to Life in Prison, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 
2006, at 3. Nine of the jurors found that Moussaoui’s unstable and violent early childhood was a 
mitigating factor. See Richard A. Serrano, Jurors Give Moussaoui Life Term, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2006, 
at A1. Several jurors talked about their determination to put their emotions aside and focus on the law. 
See Jerry Markon & Timothy Dwyer, Some Saw Moussaoui as Bit Player, Juror Says, WASH. POST, 
May 5, 2006, at A01. Defense lawyers attributed the verdict in part to the fact that some of the victim 
impact testimony came from family members opposed to the death penalty. Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui 
Gets Life: Jury’s Verdict Surprises Prosecutors, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 2006, at C1. 
 127. Bandes, supra note 59, at 406–07; see also Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of 
Empirical Research on the Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 167 
(2002) (defining restorative justice as viewing crime as a violation against the person rather than the 
abstract entity). 
 128. Logan, supra note 83, at 28–30. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim 
Impact Testimony in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143 (1999). 
 131. Logan, supra note 83, at 30. 
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loved ones.”132 The notion of institutional victims compounds the irony: the 
privatized-harm perspective, which was meant to supplement the notion of 
crime as harm to the community at large, is here supplemented by a notion of 
crimes against the community. Those who wish to speak for the community are 
required to demonstrate the bona fides of their victimhood. 
Courts, unsurprisingly, are ill-equipped to make decisions about healing and 
catharsis and often seem stymied by the complex emotional dynamics survivor 
testimony engenders in capital cases. Mass killing cases raise unique challenges 
that cannot be usefully understood without inquiry into the particular 
emotional dynamics of these trials and how these dynamics affect—and are 
affected by—the operation and goals of the capital system. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION: THE FEEDBACK LOOP 
Legal institutions inevitably rely upon implicit and explicit assumptions 
about human behavior, and often these assumptions fail to reflect growing 
knowledge about how institutional actors do in fact behave. It may not always 
be possible, or even desirable, for legal institutions to incorporate evolving 
behavioral knowledge. It may not always be possible, because legal institutions 
do not tend to have reliable mechanisms for incorporating the findings of 
relevant fields, such as the sciences or social sciences. It may not always be 
desirable, because there may be countervailing considerations at play. Accurate 
behavioral knowledge promotes many important goals in a system that relies on 
predicting and channeling human behavior, but the legal system has other 
requisites as well, including predictability, consistency, and equality of 
treatment.133 Sometimes these conflicting goals will require tradeoffs—it is not 
always necessary or advisable to act on knowledge about how emotion affects 
legal actors and legal institutions. But to make these decisions intelligently 
requires knowledge about what is being weighed. Proceeding in ignorance will 
not make the difficult choices disappear; it will simply ensure that they are 
made without sufficient information. 
Although there is increasing recognition that cognition and emotion act in 
concert, there is still a tendency to approach emotions as if they remain fixed 
across time, place, and social setting. Emotions are not static entities; they exist 
in dynamic, reciprocal relationships with social structure. To create and 
maintain effective and just legal institutions requires a continuing effort to 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. This tension is evident in the death penalty context, in which the Eighth Amendment requires 
both individualized consideration and guided discretion. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) 
(invalidating an Ohio law as not requiring individualized consideration of mitigating factors); Scott E. 
Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital 
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1991) (examining the tension between individualized 
consideration and equal treatment). 
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clarify institutional goals and to create institutional structures that help legal 
actors facilitate those goals. 
I have used the concept of closure to illustrate the pitfalls and consequences 
of using emotion language in the legal context without sufficient attention to 
the content of the emotional categories employed or to the institutional goals at 
stake. The term has a constellation of meanings, each of which has its own 
implications for institutional structure. In the death penalty context, too often 
the term is used not only without clarity, but without regard for the 
constitutional requisites of the capital trial. 
The theme of closure has reframed the entire death penalty debate. For 
many years, support for the death penalty was premised on its deterrent 
function. More recently, the weight of empirical evidence has rendered the 
deterrence rationale increasingly tenuous.134 Retribution, the major alternative 
rationale, has always been a harder sell. Retribution at one time sounded too 
close to revenge, and made people uncomfortable. The language of healing and 
closure has provided a way to soften the retribution rationale. If the death 
penalty can help survivors heal, then retribution can be viewed as therapy 
rather than bloodlust. Thus the notion of closure provides a rationale for our 
continuing commitment to the capital system. At the same time, the perceived 
requisites of closure have fueled changes in the structure of the capital system, 
including victim impact statements, truncated appeals, and broadened 
categories of death eligibility. In this way the feedback loop perpetuates itself. 
We have promised survivors that the system can give them closure, and capital 
punishment is now compelled by our promise of closure. Unfortunately, this 
therapeutic promise has little to do with the actual workings of our capital 
system: it is a poster child for the dangers of engrafting the private language of 
emotion onto a complex, hierarchical, and coercive governmental entity. 
 
 
 134. Susan Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange Persistence of the American 
Death Penalty, 42 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 21, 30–31 (2008) (discussing the current state of the empirical 
debate); John Donahue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Statistical Evidence in the Death Penalty 
Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 791 (2005) (a meta-analysis of empirical studies of deterrence). 
